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Introduction
In recent years, Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender (LGBT) rights have seemingly developed into what Roth (2014) has called the "proverbial canary in the coal mine" for countries' human rights records. A process which has taken place against the broader backdrop of the globalisation of human rights discourses (Stychin 2004) . According to Donnelly (1998, 21) , human rights "represent a progressive [contemporary] expression of the important idea that international legitimacy and full membership in the international society must rest in part on standards of just, humane or civilized behaviour." With LGBT rights now incorporated within the international human rights architecture, they came to be a norm against which countries are judged (Ammaturo 2017; Kollman and Waites 2009; Paternotte and Seckinelgin 2015) . Puar (2007) LGBT Pride parades. Consider, for example, the European Union (EU) enlargement process in which Pride events have emerged as a symbolic marker of these countries' readiness to access the EU (Ammaturo 2017; Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016) . In fact, the ability of
LGBT people to carry out their right to the freedom of assembly is used as a litmus test of Europeanness. To illustrate, (former) EU Commissioner Füle (2014) However, linking LGBT rights to the appealing idea of Europeanness is said to be "far from
[…] a harmless operation [… with potentially] huge political and social implications" (Ammaturo 2017, 93) . This being the case, the practice of using Pride as a litmus test for
Europeanness cannot be taken for granted as an unalloyed good, and must thus be critically examined. Such critical examination of the political implications of international usage of
LGBT rights and Pride as litmus test is the main focus of the presented analysis. Starting from observation that Pride is inherently a local orientated phenomenon -it is a tactic of domestic LGBT activists -, this article asks: how does the international symbolism of Pride shape its domestic politics?
By providing rich empirical material and an in-depth longitudinal critical analysis of the relational nature of the international and national politics of the Belgrade Pride and its consequences for the event's local politicality, the article adds to the emerging literature on
LGBT and queer politics in the post-Yugoslav space (see e.g. Bilić 2016c; Rhodes-Kubiak 2015) . In addition to this empirical contribution, the article has important theoretical implications for at least three fields of social inquiry. First and foremost, the research contributes to critical scholarship on the globalisation of LGBT rights by providing a muchneeded challenge to the presumed universality of Pride as a strategy for raising visibility. It is argued the EU's practice of what Rahman (2014, 281) calls 'pink-testing' has a harmful impact on local LGBT people and politics. Second, in terms of the Europeanisation of LGBT rights literature, the presented analysis challenges the widespread belief that the EU has been a force of good that improved LGBT equality in candidate countries. Doing so, the analysis also furthers the recent 'pathological turn' of the more general Europeanisation via enlargement literature (see Mendelski 2016) , despite not explicitly drawing on it. It is argued that that the domestic instrumentalisation and politicisation of reforms are not only a result the EU's outcome-focussed monitoring mechanism, but also a product of the intertwining of national and international politics. It is the relational aspect of the politics encapsulated in the enlargement process that allows for the constant negotiation and reinterpretation of EU LGBT politics in Serbia. This data is triangulated with data obtained through document analysis, most notably the EU Progress Reports, and through participant observation at the 2015 Belgrade Pride.
The article is structured in three parts. The first part situates the research in the wider literature, followed by a brief overview of the history of the Belgrade Pride between 2001 and 2015. The last part of the article discusses how this history has contributed to a transformation of the Pride in which becomes devoid of domestic LGBT politics yet a political testimony of Europeanness on the international scene.
Situating the Research
The current scholarly debate on the domestic impact of the internationalisation of LGBT politics suggests that international pressure for LGBT rights can either hinder or promote
LGBT rights, depending on a country's orientation. Indeed, it has been argued that in those countries resisting the homonationalist interpretation of modernity, the international politicisation of LGBT rights has caused backlashes (Weiss and Bosia 2013; Wilkinson 2014 ). The anti-gay propaganda laws in Russia and the so-called 'Kill the Gays Bill' in Uganda are only two examples in which the international push for LGBT rights has reduced the space for LGBT activism in the domestic arena. By contrast, it has been argued that the increased international politicisation and visibility of the LGBT norm can engender change -albeit not necessarily in a linear way -in those countries originally hostile to LGBT norms, especially when they are "embedded in international communities that champion an
LGBT norm" (Ayoub 2016, 48) .
The growing literature on the impact of the EU enlargement on LGBT rights largely supports this argument by showing that the EU accession process has contributed to the adoption of new laws in candidate countries (Ayoub 2016; O'Dwyer 2012; Slootmaeckers, Touquet, and Vermeersch 2016) . Although generally correct, the literature is potentially too optimistic in assessing how the EU enlargement process has shaped LGBT politics for at least two reasons. First, the current state of the literature has a predominant legal focus and employs an EUcentric perspective, aligning itself with the notion that the EU enlargement is an asymmetric process in which candidate countries must (at least formally) comply with EU rules.
Focussing on the top-down conceptions of Europeanisation (particularly relying on the impact of the conditionality principle), the EU's LGBT-friendliness is too often taken for granted with LGBT rights considered as non-negotiable conditions of EU membership (see e.g. O'Dwyer 2012). Such an approach, however, does not work for those issues which are not rooted in the EU acquis, as this article will demonstrate. In line with the work of Diez (2013), this article argues that EU's LGBT equality norms are not simply passed on to candidate countries, but their meanings are reinterpreted and negotiated through the political process that underlays EU enlargement. Thus, rather than asking what the domestic impact of the EU Enlargement process on LGBT rights is, one should ask from a transnational perspective how the process configures the international and national politics and what outcomes this produces.
A second reason why the existing literature might be too optimistic relates to its view on the international context. The previously mentioned notion that the international visibility of the
LGBT norm is a 'force of good' when states seek to enter the LGBT-friendly international community might not accurately reflect reality, as the international context is not just a scoping condition but in fact actively shapes (and is shaped by) domestic LGBT politics.
According to Rahman (2014, 279) , Western sexual exceptionalism is triangulated through a homocolonialist process in which homonormative nationalism is deployed "within a dialectic of respectability/otherness in a classic colonializing mode, directed at 'traditional'
['Eastern'/non-European] cultures as homophobic non-Western 'others' that need to be civilized or modernized but also constructing 'home' Western normative queer identities."
The importance of Rahman's work lies in the fact that he argues that resistance to the sexual politics of the West is very much part of the triangulation process as it accepts the configuration of Western exceptionality. As such, sexual politics are located in the relation between the EU and the candidate countries, whereby the promotion of and resistance to
LGBT equality produces political outcomes both at the international and domestic level, as well as positions local LGBT activists in an awkward liminal position, i.e., stuck between the West-East dynamic created by the EU enlargement process. This being the case, one cannot just assume an always positive impact of international LGBT norm visibility -albeit with the recognition that visibility may initially increase hostility-, but one must analyse the EU enlargement process using a transnational approach, sensitive to its relational politics and conscious of the (potential) pathological consequences of these multiscalar LGBT politics. This is particularly the case when LGBT rights are used as a litmus test or a 'standard of civilisation,' as doing so is not a harmless operation. Indeed, the litmus test nature of Pride at the international level does not only contribute to the triangulation of Western exceptionalism, but, through the political integration process, also creates a domestic opportunity to transform the domestic politics of the event to serve the elite's interests.
Indeed, as Mendelski (2016) has shown when progress is measured by outcomes rather than by processes -as is done with a litmus test -, reforms might become 'instrumentalised' and politicised by local elites to serve ulterior motives. Hence, it is argued that the EU Enlargement's homocolonialist practice of making LGBT rights, and particularly LGBT Pride, a 'standard of civilisation' or a litmus test for modernity and Europeanness produces important challenges for local LGBT activists and politics, leading to adoption of seemingly
LGBT-friendly policies or actions that, whilst serving an international agenda, remain irrelevant for the advancement of LGBT equality in the domestic sphere.
Although Europeanisation via enlargement has been a dominant framework of analysis when studying candidate EU members, this article does not draw from this literature as its tends to be relatively insensitive to the politics of enlargement and focuses too much on institutions.
Indeed, this strand of literature would ask how the Enlargement process contributed to the occurrence of Pride, without considering how LGBT equality norms are reinterpreted and/or transformed by the process. In order to capture the latter, this article instead draws from the recent work of Szulc (2018) , who convincingly calls for a transnational approach to the study of LGBT politics in the former-communist regions. The multiscalar character of such an approach is indeed best suited for the purpose of this research as it does favour on level over the other, but rather takes the national and non-national as supplementary levels of analysis.
Thus, rather than analysing a top-down impact of the international setting on the domestic politics, a transnational analysis highlights, as Szulc (2018, 10) rightfully notes, that "it is not those different scales separately but their combination and imbrication that created unique conditions, with unique opportunities and challenges, for lives and activisms of [local LGBT people] ." As such, this article analyses how the specific combination of international and national LGBT politics as part of the European integration process has contributed to the reconfiguration of Belgrade Pride's politics.
Taking this into account, it is important to note at this point that whilst the EU may indeed have come to use Pride parades as a litmus test for the Europeanness (see e.g. Slootmaeckers and Touquet 2016), these events are not imposed on candidate countries per se. In fact, they only seem to enter the international agenda after local actors express an interest in organising it. Pride, then, is not a foreign-imposed event, but neither is it devoid of an international dimension. Pride events across the world remain deeply embedded in the history of 'Western Pride' as well as their current imagery. Acknowledging this reality, as well as the domestic origin of the desire to organise Pride, Pride is considered to be a local, yet vernacularised version of a globalised event (Thoreson 2014 ). Hence, one should not study how the EU enforces LGBT Pride on candidate countries, but rather examine how European pink-testing using Pride affects the domestic politics of Pride by reinscribing the international character of a practice that was previously vernacularised.
How Belgrade Pride Became a Litmus Test for Serbia's Europeanness
Due to the limitation of space, a complete year-by-year analysis of the history of the Belgrade Pride is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, based on such analysis presented elsewhere (see Slootmaeckers 2016), we can summarise its history into three distinct phases, which are each characterised by different configuration of domestic and international politics (see figure 1) . Indeed, the data has indicated that throughout its history, Belgrade Pride has been subject to political calculations, both at the domestic and international levels. Whilst domestically, politicians made decisions on Pride based on their attempts to balance nationalist politics and Serbia's EU aspirations, at the European scale, the EU reaction was determined by its need to offset regional stability and security with the promotion of human rights.
[insert Figure also linked the Pride discursively to the EU integration process, as political leaders publicly expressed their support for Pride by explicitly linking it to the EU's values. In fact, the government used the Pride so as to demonstrate its pro-EU credentials by seemingly coorganising of the event. However, while the government indeed provided the conditions for Pride to happen, it did not take any preventative measures to stop the anti-gay riots that followed 2010 Pride from happening (Ejdus and Božović 2016) .
The outburst of extreme violence was in the following years used by the government to engage in what can only be described as a securitisation process of the Pride, in which Pride was portrayed as an event that threatened Serbia's national security. In the following three years, the state used the riots and security threats as an excuse to -in the words of a government official -"postpone" 
The Belgrade 'Ghost' Pride as a Pathology of European Pressure
Although the return of Belgrade Pride in 2014 was able to force the topic of LGBT issues into the public debate and forced the state authorities to recognise the presence of LGBT lives, these achievements have been partly hollowed out as a consequence of the transnational politics of the event and the homocolonialist process of triangulating of EU's sexual exceptionalism through the promotion of and resistance to LGBT equality. I will discuss this process in two subsections. Whereas the first part focuses on the internationalisation and the local decoupling of Pride, the second section discusses the cooptation of pride and the militarisation of pride. Although these four sub-processes are discussed separately, it is important to note that they are dynamic, interlinked and mutually reinforcing.
Internationalisation and local decoupling of pride Although non-organising activists recognise these political conditions created by the bans, they nevertheless seem to hold Pride organisers partly responsible for the disconnect with the
LGBT population, especially highlighting their poor communication with the 'community'
and activist scene. As one activist eloquently describes: 
The Co-optation and Militarisation of Pride
The detachment from the people Pride claims to represent as well as its 'litmus test-isation' raises important questions about the ownership of Pride; as Marko Karadžić suggests:
What I really dislike about the policy coming from the European Union is that the [progress] reports are praising the events which are not actually a step forward.
[…] the message that has to be communicated after the Pride, I believe, has to be different from the one that we have. First of all, we do not have one. The messages sent after the 2010 Pride and even the last one [2014] were: "The state and politicians are not against us [ LGBT people], because the EU pressures [Serbia] for these 'faggots' to get together," and then "it is a huge step because we had [Pride]", but the question one should ask is: "who had it [Pride] ? A few NGO activists, the EU ambassadors and 5,000 policemen, in order to write a good report so that the EU can tell that there is good progress in Serbia?" 14 (emphasis added)
Karadžić's question of 'who had Pride?' is indeed a critical issue to consider. If Pride is not for and/or by LGBT people, then for whom and by whom is the Pride organised, and why?
Although it is undeniable that the organisation of Pride in Serbia has forced (some) state institutions -especially the police -to recognise LGBT people as citizens, the same cannot It seems to me that the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Progressive Party are planning to hijack our forms, render them meaningless, empty them from their political content... and then simply throw them away... the sole purpose of all of this is meeting "the standards" [European Union conditions]... this has nothing to do with our needs, but it is something which is asked from them... they are asked for Kosovo and they are asked for this (Pride). (quoted in Bilić 2016b, 135) In the years to follow, this fear seemed to be well-founded as the state-condoned violence 16 that accompanied the 2010 Pride provided politicians with the perfect excuse to withdraw their public support for LGBT equality and the Pride in particular. Politicians were quick to blame the LGBT activists' provocative Pride and the EU pressure for the destruction of
Belgrade (see . Moreover, as the international community -particularly the EU-strategically decided to focus on the success of the Pride and congratulated the state for maintaining the event, a message was sent to politicians that Pride could be strategically used as a pragmatic 'homonationalist tool' with the aim to formally fulfil the EU's accession
conditions.
An additional benefit of the riots for the government was that it provided an excuse to push the LGBT issues off the political agenda. Indeed, in a period of political instability in which organising Pride would be too costly, the government used security reasons as a pretext to ban the Pride, thereby 'postponing' dealing with Pride until the (new) government sufficiently consolidated its power. Until the latter happened, it was more beneficial for the government to ban the Pride. Indeed, Perunović (2015, 82) convincingly argued that the Pride bans were an opportunity for the Serbian government to exercise its sovereignty with the goal to reinforce its power position "under the guise of its protective role (paradoxically impotent and omnipotent at the same time 24 The security perimeter -officially created to protect Pride participants -has a secondary function of a "transparent closet" (Kuhar 2011 ) that keeps LGBT people's visibility invisible and outside the public sphere. Apart from this physical appearance, the transparent closet also exists discursively. As already mentioned, the explicit media focus on Pride's security aspects and potential bans has contributed to the discursive invisibility of LGBT lived experiences and grievances. In other words, by securitising Pride, LGBT visibility is kept to a minimum, i.e., a ritualistic ("leisurely") walk through the city devoid of politics. Anita Mitić (Pride organiser) explains how she feels that the state and the police are demonstrating their power much more than they are protecting us.
[…] Like they are exactly isolating us and protecting us in the same way, because I feel that sometimes [with Pride and other street actions] they [the police] always come, so many of them and you are like 'is this really necessary?' You are surrounded by police, no one can pass you, and you do not have any kind of contact with the population, there is you, the circle of police and the rest of the world.
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Although the political appropriation of Pride aimed at 'closeting' the visibility politics of the event cannot be denied, the organisers' complicity in this development cannot go unnoticed. Rahman (2014, 281) calls 'pinktesting', combined with the domestic resistance to this has had a harmful impact on local
LGBT people and politics. Whereas using Pride as a litmus test for Europeanness has led to a politicisation of the issue on the international level, it also allowed for the transformation of Pride's national politics. Over the years, Belgrade Pride has been co-opted by the state to demonstrate Europeanness towards the EU, whilst the militarisation of the event created a 'Ghost Pride,' a state-tolerated manifestation of Pride which takes place in a militarised 'transparent closet' that keeps LGBT people's visibility strategies invisible and outside the public sphere, reinforcing traditional and nationalist conceptions of Serbian society.
Moreover, the intertwining of international and domestic politics surrounding the Belgrade Pride made that LGBT activists, and Pride organisers in particular, came to occupy a rather impossible position caught between national and European politics, with limited room to escape the homocolonialist implications of the EU's pink-testing. This being the case, Serbian Pride organisers opted to align themselves with the attractive idea of Europeanness in order to allow Pride to happen as an event. Indeed, with the aim to overcome the bans but also to increase the saliency of the issue, they framed the Pride as an expression of the universal human right of freedom of assembly, linking it discursively to the European integration process. Although the internationalisation of the Pride helped to make Pride possible from 2014 onwards, this strategy also backfired as it led to the domestic depoliticisation of Pride. Increasingly decoupled from its local constituency, without sufficient support from its grassroots and with a strong reliance on the apolitical human rights discourses, Pride became a form of activism, an outcome rather than a tool to achieve change and devoid of LGBT politics.
The presented findings also have important implications for the Europeanisation of LGBT rights literature. Similar to the work of Bilić (2016a; 2016b) , the article has challenged the prevailing notion that the EU accession process has been a force of good for post-Yugoslav
LGBT rights and provides a more critical understanding of how the transnational LGBT politics shape LGBT politics in the region. However, the presented analysis furthers Bilić's analysis by arguing that the local disconnect of the Pride with the 'community' and the absence of a political agenda is not just due to the EU's imperial-like LGBT rights conditionality, but is also the result of the limitations in opportunities for local LGBT activisms produced by transnational character of LGBT politics. Indeed, it is argued that it was a complex feedback loop of domestic and international LGBT politics that produced critical challenges for activisms which, in turn, limited the politicality of the Belgrade Pride.
As long as activists are caught in the liminal position between the EU and the national (within the East-West dynamic), developing a locally-grounded version of Pride might prove to be difficult, yet not necessarily impossible.
The article also raises important questions related the more general Europeanisation literature. Through the transnational analysis presented in this research, it is suggested that the EU enlargement process should be thought of as a political process where the intertwining of domestic and international politics together produces outcomes which the dominant approaches in the Europeanisation literature cannot fully explain. Indeed, rather than analysing the domestic impact of the EU in candidate countries, this article has shown that it is through the particular usage of LGBT rights within the transnational context and the interaction between domestic and international politics that the meaning of the LGBT equality norms and Pride in particular has been re-interpreted. Thus, extending the 'pathological turn' in the Europeanisation literature (see Mendelski 2016) , this article has demonstrated that instrumentalisation and politicisation of reforms is not only the result of the EU's flawed outcome-focussed monitoring system, but is also a product of the particular configuration of international and national politics.
In sum, these presented findings call for a more critical analysis of the civilisational politics embedded in the EU enlargement process (but also the Eastern Partnership, for example, in relation to Kyiv Pride) -whether it be in LGBT rights or other fields -that goes beyond tracing institutional changes to include the specific transnational configurations of politics and the complexities and outcomes these produce. 
